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Securities class actions are the most economically significant form
of litigation. Highly skilled lawyers expend huge sums and relentless
efforts in these matters but because of the costs involved and the potential
for enormous liability very few of them ever make it to trial. This Article
is the story of one that did, a mammoth fraud where a jury returned a
$1.5 billion verdict that, with interest, increased to almost $2.5 billion by
the time the case reached the appellate court.
There the Court upheld the shareholders’ theory that their
damages could be measured by the excessive amounts they had to pay for
their shares whose value was artificially inflated by the defendants’ false
financial statements. In doing that the appellate panel significantly
strengthened the potential claims of shareholders in these actions by
accepting a new approach to reckoning their losses called the “leakage
model.” It allows damages to be determined by fixing the decline in the
price the stockholders paid for their shares from the time news of the
fraud first becomes available, rather than when the defendants ultimately
acknowledge their wrongdoing.
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Thanks to the unyielding work of their lawyers, the case was a
grand success for the shareholders, returning them a significant
percentage of the money they lost. Yet it took 14 years to litigate and
initially cost the plaintiffs’ attorneys, who bore all their clients’ expenses,
over $30 million. If we are truly committed to achieving justice in these
shareholder frauds the law must find a more expeditious way to deter
such wrongful conduct and compensate investors like these who are
cheated.
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I. INTRODUCTION: SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS
A large portion of the wealth of our nation lies in the treasuries of
its publicly held corporations.1 Those resources belong to their
shareholders2 and are supposed to be managed faithfully for them by
their officers and directors.3 State corporate laws require that they
discharge those responsibilities as fiduciaries4 and the federal
securities laws reinforce that notion by compelling accurate disclosure
of all significant aspects of their businesses.5

1. A report in 2011 stated that there were then approximately 6,700 large public corporations
whose shares were actively traded. It also noted that even though they comprise a small fraction of
the 5.8 million U.S. businesses operating in the corporate form, those firms generate the lion’s share
of our country’s economic activity. HOWARD M. FRIEDMAN, PUBLICLY HELD CORPORATIONS: A
LAWYER’S GUIDE 1 (2011).
Recent findings, however, indicate that number is shrinking. One stated that although there
were over 7,000 companies listed on exchanges in the late 1990s, that number is now down to
3,671. Why the Decline in the Number of Listed American Firms Matters, ECONOMIST:
SCHUMPETER BLOG (Apr. 22, 2017), https://www.economist.com/business/2017/04/22/why-thedecline-in-the-number-of-listed-american-firms-matters. That author also noted that there are now
roughly one hundred unicorns, “private firms worth over $1 billion.” Id.; cf. Andy Kessler,
Unicorns Need IPOs, WALL ST. J. OPINION. (Jan. 7, 2018, 4:37 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/unicorns-need-ipos-1515361043 (asserting that unicorns must make
public offerings of their shares to achieve the liquidity that will actualize their full potential); see
also Jason M. Thomas, Where Have All the Public Companies Gone?, WALL ST. J. OPINION (Nov.
16, 2017, 7:10 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/where-have-all-the-public-companies-gone1510869125 (stating that the number of initial public offerings has fallen from 845 in 1996 to just
128 in 2016). Consistent with that, the Wall Street Journal reported that public investors do not
now own a large number of the “growth stocks.” Id. Instead, shares of those companies have
“migrated” to private portfolios. Id. As the previously cited author noted critically about that
phenomenon, “[o]rdinary Americans without connections are meanwhile unable directly to own
shares in new companies that are active in the fastest-growing parts of the economy. ECONOMIST:
SCHUMPETER BLOG, supra.
2. As one court famously put it: “A business corporation is organized and carried on
primarily for the profit of the stockholders.” Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich.
1919). As to how that wealth is ultimately distributed to shareholders, see MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
§ 6.40 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
3. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
4. Id. As one noted commentator stated: “Like both trustees and agents, directors and officers
act for the benefit of another, in this case the corporation. As such, just as trustees have a fiduciary
duty to their beneficiaries, and agents have a fiduciary duty to their principals, directors and officers
have a fiduciary duty to their corporations.” FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 278 (2d
ed. 2010).
5. There are two foundational pieces of legislation there. The first, the Securities Act of 1933,
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2006) (Securities Act), requires, subject to certain exemptions, that
securities be registered with a government agency, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC
or Commission), before they can be offered or sold. The second, the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78mm (2012) (Exchange Act), contains a host of provisions regulating the
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While most corporate officials operate their firms honestly and in
accord with the law,6 some mislead their stockholders and the public
by distorting the truth about their operations.7 Usually that takes the
form of falsified disclosures and financial statements designed to
make their companies appear to be more successful than they really
are.8 In these situations, those who trade shares are deceived—with
purchasers paying artificially inflated prices for their stock.9
When the truth comes out about those misrepresentations by
public companies, share prices of their stock often drop and investors
suffer the resulting losses.10 Many times, there are hundreds,
thousands, or even tens of thousands of shareholders injured by these
deceptions11 and their damages can run into the millions and in some
trading of securities, including a requirement that public companies make periodic and current
reports about their operations.
6. MARK S. BEASLEY et AL., COMM. OF SPONSORING ORGS. OF THE TREADWAY COMM’N,
FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING 1998–2007: AN ANALYSIS OF U.S. PUBLIC COMPANIES 2
(2010), https://www.coso.org/Documents/COSO-Fraud-Study-2010-001.pdf.
7. The same study, however, cataloged 347 false and misleading reporting cases brought by
the SEC during the years 1997–2008. Id. Since that time, corporate fraud has been on the rise. A
recent study published by the consulting firm Kroll surveyed a large number of American and
global firms. Seventy-five percent of them reported that they had been victims of fraud during the
recent year. KROLL, GLOBAL FRAUD REPORT: VULNERABILITIES ON THE RISE 7 (2015–2016 ed.).
Forty percent of those companies felt highly or moderately vulnerable to corruption and bribery.
Id. at 8.
8. BEASLEY et AL., supra note 6.
9. See infra p. 108.
10. James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 497,
502 (1997).
11. The ability of these defrauded investors with relatively small claims to band together in a
class action allows them to seek redress when their individual actions would not merit the expense
of litigation. James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV.
497, 497 (1997). Another leading commentator made much the same point: “Securities class actions
have an appealing attraction to those seeking to deter fraud. If a party commits fraud that affects
hundreds, if not thousands of dispersed shareholders, allowing a plaintiffs’ attorney to aggregate
the claims into a single class action makes the pursuit of such claims both more manageable and
economical.” Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1465,
1522 (2004). The Supreme Court recognized this beneficial aspect of securities class actions with
these comments in one such case: “Class actions also may permit the plaintiffs to pool claims which
would be uneconomical to litigate individually. For example, this lawsuit involves claims averaging
about $100 per plaintiff; most of the plaintiffs would have no realistic day in court if a class action
were not available.” Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985). A notable critic of
class actions, however, is the retired U.S. Court of Appeals Judge, Richard Posner. At a gathering
of lawyers who practice in that area, he referred to class actions as “an invitation to shenanigans”
because “the client—the class—is basically helpless.” Perry Cooper, Posner: Class Action Rules,
Constitution Overrated, BLOOMBERG BNA NEWS (Oct. 28, 2016), https://www.bna.com/posnerclass-action-n57982081985/. He went on to talk about how lawyers for the class make the
decisions, but they “seem to be primarily interested in attorneys’ fees . . . . And the defendants are
just interested in getting off as lightly as they can.” Id.
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situations even billions of dollars.12
Such actions are violations of federal13 and state securities laws14
and may involve other wrongdoings as well, such as mail and wire
fraud.15 Those responsible may therefore be criminally prosecuted or
otherwise sanctioned by government agencies, such as the Department
of Justice and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”
or the “Commission”), whose mandate is to administer and enforce the
federal securities laws.16 Unfortunately, they have been less
aggressive of late in seeking sanctions for such wrongdoing.17 The
SEC, in particular, lacks the resources to investigate and prosecute
most of the securities violations that occur.18
In any event, the SEC does not directly represent individual
shareholders who have bought stock in companies and been cheated
12. In recent decades, tens of billions of dollars have been recovered in settlement of these
shareholders’ suits. Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009
WIS. L. REV. 151, 152 (2009).
13. Securities fraud is prohibited by § 17(a) and § 10(b) (along with Rule 10b-5 promulgated
under it) of the Securities Act, and § 15(c) of the Exchange Act. Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 15
U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2012); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 10(b), 15(c), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b),
78o(c) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018). Section 24 of the Securities Act and § 32(a) of the
Exchange Act impose criminal sanctions on anyone who willfully violates the provisions
proscribing fraud. Securities Act of 1933 § 24; Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 32(a).
14. The Uniform Securities Act, the basis of securities regulation in many states, criminalizes
the willful violation of various provisions of that Act, including its registration and anti-fraud
provisions. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 508 (2002) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE
LAWS, amended 2005); UNIF. SEC. ACT of 1985 § 604 (1985) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS
ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, amended 1988); UNIF. SEC. ACT of 1956 § 409, 7C U.L.A. 873 (2006).
15. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1346 (2012).
16. For a full description of the SEC and its mission, see Office of the Investor Advocate, U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/page/investor-advocate-landing-page (last visited
Oct. 9, 2018).
17. See JESSE EISINGER, THE CHICKENSHIT CLUB: WHY THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT FAILS TO
PROSECUTE EXECUTIVES (2017); SAMUEL W. BUELL, CAPITAL OFFENSES: BUSINESS CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA’S CORPORATE AGE (2016); Patrick Radden Keefe, Limited Liability:
Why Don’t Corporate Wrongdoers Get Charged?, NEW YORKER, July 31, 2017, at 28. Keefe
particularly faults the Justice Department for its practice of deferring prosecution of corporate
wrongdoers.
18. When the author was a junior staff attorney in the SEC’s Enforcement Division in the late
1970s, a senior SEC lawyer told him that the Commission had the resources to prosecute no more
than 2% of the then occurring securities law violations. Over thirty years later, at a conference on
securities law held in Portland, Oregon, he heard a similar statement by an SEC official from one
of its regional offices. This time, the Commission attorney said that his agency only had the ability
to prosecute 1% of the current securities law violations. MARC I. STEINBERG et AL., SECURITIES
LITIGATION 685 (2016). A well-respected financial columnist for The New York Times perhaps
described this situation best with these remarks: “It is no secret that the Securities and Exchange
Commission is terrifically understaffed and widely underfunded compared with the populous and
wealthy Wall Street world it is supposed to police.” Gretchen Morgenson, Quick, Call Tech Support
for the S.E.C., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2007, at 31.
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by paying more than they should have.19 However, given the human
temptation to such misconduct that is ever-present to those who
control “other people’s money,”20 it is hard to see how the trust needed
in private capital formation could exist if investors did not have the
means to recover their losses caused by such wrongful activity.
Fortunately, our legal system affords defrauded investors an
avenue to seek such redress by bringing their own civil claims in these
matters.21 The prospect of liability thus compels those seeking capital
to make accurate disclosure of all relevant information that investors
might need.22 It also provides that they may be held financially
responsible when they fail to do so.23
Securities frauds that involve large numbers of shareholders are
mass torts.24 To remedy them, the legal system allows stockholder
victims to bring suit together as a class against the corporations and
their officials who perpetrate such wrongs.25 Those actions not only
allow defrauded shareholders to recoup their damages, but they also
deter others who might consider engaging in such illegal activity.26
A Congressional Committee aptly described the dual function
that these suits have to both compensate victims and discourage such
transgressions in the future.
Private securities litigation is an indispensable tool with
which defrauded investors can recover their losses without
having to rely on government action. Such private lawsuits
promote public and global confidence in our capital markets
and help to deter wrongdoing and to guarantee that corporate
19. The SEC, however, does advise aggrieved investors on its website about various legal
remedies they might pursue to seek redress for securities fraud. See How Can Investors Get Money
Back in a Fraud Case Involving a Violation of the Federal Securities Laws?, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/page/investor-section-landing (last modified Dec. 29, 2016).
20. The classic work here is LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE
BANKERS USE IT (1914).
21. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(1) (2012).
22. STEINBERG et AL., supra note 18, at 7.
23. See id. (“Securities litigation also compensates investors who are injured by incomplete or
inaccurate disclosures, and the availability of that encourages investors to enter the market.”).
24. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(a)(3).
25. See STEINBERG et AL., supra note 18, at 9–10.
26. See Marc I. Steinberg, Curtailing Investor Protection Under the Securities Laws: Good
for the Economy?, 55 SMU L. REV. 347, 353–54 (2002). Given that settlements in the typical
shareholder class action suit may not provide much compensation to individual shareholders,
deterrence may be their principle benefit. Ann M. Lipton, Reviving Reliance, 86 FORDHAM L. REV.
91, 102 (2017). In the case discussed in this Article, however, the shareholders did recover a
significant percentage of their losses. See infra notes 35–36 and accompanying text.
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officers, auditors, directors, lawyers and others properly
perform their jobs.27
The Supreme Court has also noted the need for shareholder suits
to police corrupt corporate activity. As it said in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor
Issues & Rights, Ltd., “This Court has long recognized that
meritorious private actions to enforce federal antifraud securities laws
are an essential supplement to criminal and civil enforcement actions
brought, respectively, by the Department of Justice and the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC).”28 In addition, as noted by one
commentator, shareholder plaintiffs and their attorneys “may be more
willing to invest in complex cases and expand the boundaries of the
law than their public counterparts.”29
These suits, known as securities class actions, are complex legal
proceedings. The lawyers who bring them must not only be
knowledgeable in the intricate laws and policies governing financial
instruments, but they also have to be highly skilled in pretrial and trial
practice.30 In addition, these cases entail great risks for plaintiffs’
attorneys who take them on.31 This litigation is hugely expensive for
those law firms and they typically undertake them on a contingent fee
basis, receiving no compensation unless their clients secure a

27. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.).
28. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313 (2007). The Supreme
Court made similar statements several times in earlier cases. See, e.g., Bateman Eichler, Hill
Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 310 (1985); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432
(1964). In another case, the Court also had this to say about the general importance of private antifraud actions: “[A] dynamic, free economy presupposes a high degree of integrity in all of its parts,
an integrity that must be underwritten by rules enforceable in fair, independent, accessible courts.”
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 161 (2008).
29. Lipton, supra note 26, at 100.
30. For an elaborate discussion of all the litigation skills that these suits require, see
STEINBERG et AL., supra note 18, at 573, 623. Shareholder class actions suits, however, are not
without their critics. In a case involving claims that a company did not make appropriate disclosures
to stockholders regarding a merger, Judge Richard Posner used a well-worn pejorative term, “strike
suit”, to describe such actions brought “for the sole purpose of obtaining fees for the plaintiffs’
counsel.” Hays v. Walgreen Co. (In re Walgreen Co. Stockholder Litig.), 832 F.3d 718, 721 (7th
Cir. 2016); see also Debra Cassens Weiss, Posner Opinion Blasts Class Actions that Are ‘No Better
than a Racket’, A.B.A. J. (Aug. 12, 2016, 8:15 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article
/posner_opinion_blasts_class_actions_that_are_no_better_than_a_racket; Cooper, supra note 11
(Judge Posner (now retired) has made what one observer called “tongue-in-cheek” comments about
class actions by calling them “an invitation to shenanigans.”).
31. Professor Cox described the intrepid attitude of the lawyers who bring these often
mammoth suits: “[T] he sheer size of the aggregated claim attracts not only the entrepreneurial
skills of the class lawyer but also commands the full attention of the defendants.” Cox, supra note
10, at 497.
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recovery.32
II. THE HOUSEHOLD SUIT
This Article describes such a case brought against a major
financial institution, Household International, Inc. (Household). It is
one of the most significant securities class actions of recent times
because it not only achieved a standout result for shareholders, but it
was also one of very few such suits that actually went to trial.33 While
it may be a bit much to call lawyers who bring these actions
“Guardians of the Galaxy,”34 this litigation demonstrates how difficult
it is for shareholders to prevail in these matters, yet how essential the
work of their lawyers is to maintaining the honesty of our economy
and the integrity of our financial markets.
In Glickenhaus & Co. v. Household Int’l, Inc.,35 over thirty
thousand shareholders36 sued together claiming that they suffered
losses because of the public representations made by the company and
some of its senior officials.37 It took fourteen years to litigate the
matter.38 That entailed seven years of pretrial practice,39 a twenty-six
32. As one commentator put it succinctly, lead counsel in these cases is the “litigation’s
financier.” Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Optimal Lead Plaintiffs, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1109, 1115
(2011). As the author stated earlier in that article, “Good lead counsel is hard to find,” going on to
discuss various approaches to make sure that such lawyers adequately represent the interests of
their clients, the defrauded shareholders. Id. at 1110. Others have also expressed concerns that
plaintiffs’ attorneys, facing mounting financial challenges, would agree to an inadequate settlement
out of self-interest. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr. Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the
Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 281 (1983). Professor
Burch’s article discusses these issues in the context of the requirement that the Court appoint a lead
plaintiff counsel in securities class actions. Burch, supra. Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§ 21D(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(b)(v) (2012).
33. See Matthew L. Mustokoff & Margaret E. Mazzeo, Loss Causation on Trial in Rule 10b5 Litigation a Decade After Dura, 70 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 175, 217 (2017) (“Moreover, there is no
reason to believe that the rate of securities class actions advancing to trial—21 out of roughly 5,000
cases filed . . . , or 0.4%—will increase any time soon.”).
34. See Guardians of the Galaxy (film), WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guardians_
of_the_Galaxy (last edited Jan. 12, 2019, Oct. 15, 2018, 7:00 PM) (“Guardians of the Galaxy . . .
is a 2014 American superhero film based on the Marvel Comics superhero team . . . .”).
35. 787 F.3d 408 (7th Cir. 2015).
36. This and much of the procedural history of the case are taken from an elaborate report to
the court by plaintiffs’ counsel. See Declaration of Spencer A. Burkholz in Support of Plaintiffs’
Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement and Motion for Approval of Attorneys’ Fees
and Expenses and Award of Expenses to Lead Plaintiffs at 3, Lawrence E. Jaffe Pension Plan v.
Household Int’l, Inc., 2016 WL 10571774 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 10, 2016) (No. 02-C-5893) [hereinafter
Burkholz Report].
37. Id. at 5.
38. Id. at 4.
39. Id. at 5–90.
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day jury trial40 that resulted in a whopping $1.5 billion verdict (which
the award of prejudgment interest increased to nearly $2.5 billion),41
and an elaborate post-trial claims process.42 After that came a reversal
on appeal43 and lengthy preparations for a retrial that culminated in a
final settlement of $1.575 billion in the early morning hours before the
second trial was to begin.44
All in all the plaintiffs and their lawyers achieved a stunning
outcome, returning investors a large percentage of their losses.45 The
trial judge stated at a pretrial hearing that there were a hundred ways
that the plaintiffs could lose the case, but only one way that they could
win it.46 But win it they did, with the lawyers for the class vindicating
the integrity of our financial system.
The Court of Appeals began its opinion, which ultimately sent the
case back for retrial, by noting the complexity and lengthy procedural
history of the Household case.47 Instead of recounting all of that
however, the panel said it would “start with the view from 10,000 feet
and add details relevant to particular issues as needed.”48 The case did
indeed raise a host of legal questions and as the Court of Appeals said,
“a tome” could be written about all of them.49
This Article however will adopt a middle ground, describing this
record-setting lawsuit50 more extensively than did the Court of
Appeals. It will present that in the context of the rules and policies that
make up this highly specialized but extremely important area of law.
Ultimately, all that will form a backdrop to a discussion of the issue
40. Id. at 1.
41. Glickenhaus & Co. v. Household Int’l, Inc., 787 F.3d 408, 412 (7th Cir. 2015).
42. Burkholz Report, supra note 36, at 2.
43. Glickenhaus & Co., 787 F.3d at 433.
44. Burkholz Report, supra note 36, at 1.
45. Depending on the damage model used, class members recovered amounts that were
between 75% to 252% of their losses. That far exceeds the percentage recovery of all the other
securities settlements valued in excess of $500 million. Plaintiff’s Reply Memorandum in Support
of Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement and Plan of Allocation of Settlement
Proceeds at 1, Lawrence E. Jaffe Pension Plan v. Household Int’l, Inc., 2016 WL 10571774 (N.D.
Ill. Nov. 10, 2016) (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2016) (No. 02-C-5893) [hereinafter Reply Memo].
46. As recounted to the author by Michael Dowd, attorney for the plaintiff.
47. Glickenhaus & Co., 787 F.3d at 413–14.
48. Id. at 413.
49. Id.
50. As the court of appeals noted, the “enormous” $2.46 billion judgment for the plaintiffs
appeared to be one of the largest to date. Id. at 412 (citing Reuters, HSBC Faces $2.46 Billion
Judgment in Securities Fraud Case, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/
2013/10/18/business/hsbc-is-fined-2-46-billion-in-securities-fraud-case.html).
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that the Court of Appeals found so crucial—how to calculate
shareholder damages in such a huge fraud.
A. The Fraud
Household was a Chicago-based holding company with
subsidiaries that provided loans to subprime customers—individuals
who for the most part had less than stellar credit histories.51 By the
1990s, through growth and acquisitions, Household had become one
of the nation’s largest mortgage lenders.52 It also made home-equity
loans and engaged in auto financing and credit card lending.53
Household funded much of its operations by reselling its loans as
asset-backed securities and continuing to service them for a fee.54 For
the five years from October 1997 to October 2002, it used that process
to raise $75 billion.55
The company supported those sales of its loans as well as the price
of its stock by assuring the market that its loan pools were stable and
consistently profitable.56 It claimed to have achieved that by using
sophisticated centralized technology that gave it a competitive
advantage in monitoring its customers’ accounts to guard against
delinquencies.57
In reality, however, Household’s purported success resulted from
predatory lending practices that confused its borrowers about interest
rates and other aspects of their obligations.58 It was also attributable to
what might euphemistically be called “re-aging” and “restructuring”
of its non-performing loans.59 That involved distortion of metrics used
to record the percentage of its loans that were delinquent so that they

51. Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint for Violation of the Federal Securities
Laws at 4, Lawrence E. Jaffe Pension Plan v. Household Int’l, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 2d 928 (N.D. Ill.
2010) (No. 02-C-5893) [hereinafter Complaint].
52. Id. at 4.
53. Glickenhaus & Co., 787 F.3d at 413.
54. Complaint, supra note 51, at 5.
55. Id.
56. See id. at 4.
57. Id.
58. See Glickenhaus & Co., 787 F.3d at 413. Throughout its early history, however,
Household did not encourage such improvident practices by its customers. As one of its early radio
commercials put it: “Never borrow money needlessly, just when you must. Borrow where the loans
are a specialty from folks you trust. Borrow confidently from H-F-C.” HFC - Household Finance
Corporation: Radio Commercials, YOUTUBE (Feb. 28, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=vg5gtjKhRDc.
59. Glickenhaus & Co., 787 F.3d at 413.
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would not have to be written down as uncollectable.60 In addition,
Household used other impermissible accounting techniques to make
its operations appear stronger and more lucrative than they were.61
These practices, which began in 1997, were authorized by the
company’s top officials and were ingrained in Household’s corporate
culture.62 Most significantly, they made it possible for Household
falsely to report record financial results that bolstered the price of its
shares. Between the summers of 1999 and 2001, the company’s stock
price thus rose more than 50% from around $40 per share to the mid
$60s, hitting a high of $69 in July 2001.63
The truth about the company however began to emerge later that
year due to investigations and legal actions by various State Attorneys
General that focused on Household’s illegal lending practices.64 Those
began with a suit by California on November 15, 2001.65 Household
ultimately settled them on October 11, 2002 by paying $484 million
to all fifty states.66 That resulted in the company taking a $525 million
charge to its financial statements.67 Household was also forced to
restate its financials due to improper accounting of its expenses.68 That
lowered its earnings by $386 million.69
Between the initiation of the California action and the multistate
settlement, the price of the company’s shares decreased 54% from
$60.90 to $28.20—far worse than drops in the comparative S&P 500
and S&P financial indexes that were respectively 25% and 21%.70
Perhaps believing it would then be getting a bargain, HSBC Holdings
from the United Kingdom, at that time the world’s second largest
bank, acquired Household in November 2002 for just over $16
billion.71 It was a decision that HSBC would later regret because it
eventually made that financial giant liable in this litigation as

60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Complaint, supra note 51, at 19–23.
63. Glickenhaus & Co., 787 F.3d at 413.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Burkholz Report, supra note 36, at 5.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Glickenhaus & Co., 787 F.3d at 413.
71. Erik Portanger et al., HSBC Sets $16 Billion Deal for Household International, WALL ST.
J. (Nov. 15, 2002, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1037262079434607068.
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Household’s successor.72
Household’s problems with government authorities however
were not over. Its final day of reckoning with them came in March
2003 when it entered into a consent decree with the SEC agreeing to
cease and desist from engaging in improper re-aging of its delinquent
accounts.73
B. Pre-Trial Litigation
The first shareholder fraud complaints were filed in August 2002
in the U.S. District Court in Chicago.74 On October 18, 2002, when
the number of similar suits filed had risen to seven, a group of
investors led by Glickenhaus Institutional Group and represented by
the law firm later renamed Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd (Robbins
Geller)75 moved to have the actions consolidated and be designated
lead plaintiff and counsel. After several other plaintiffs and their
attorneys withdrew similar motions, the court granted Glickenhaus
and Robbins Geller’s motion on December 18, 2002.76
Several months later, the Robbins Geller firm filed a 154 page
consolidated complaint.77 In addition to Household, it named as
defendants 16 officers and directors of the company as well as its
auditor, Arthur Anderson, and two investment banks that had
72. Household was merged into Household International, Inc. and its name changed to HSBC
Finance Corporation. As the company’s press release stated, “The name change to HSBC Finance
Corporation furthers the rebranding of Household to HSBC.” The release also announced that
HSBC would assume all the obligations of Household. HSBC Merges Household Finance
Corporation into Household International, Inc.; Renames Entity “HSBC Finance Corporation”,
BUS. WIRE (Dec. 15, 2004, 4:01 PM), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/200412150057
87/en/HSBC-Merges-Household-Finance-Corporation-Household-International.
By March 2009, HSBC was shutting down much of the consumer finance business it had
gotten by purchasing Household and writing off its value. HSBC’s Chairman Stephen Green then
said, “With the benefit of hindsight, this is an acquisition we wish we had not undertaken.” Steve
Slater, HSBC Retreats from U.S., Regrets Household Deal, REUTERS (Mar. 2, 2009, 4:22 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hsbc-us-sb-idUSTRE52127520090302.
73. Household International Agrees to Cease-and-Desist Order for False and Misleading
Statements About Restructuring Policies Concerning Delinquent Loans, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-35.htm (last modified Mar. 19, 2003).
74. Burkholz Report, supra note 36, at 5.
75. The Robbins Geller firm is among the most prominent group of lawyers who represent
shareholders. It has obtained some of the largest securities class action recoveries in American legal
history, including most famously a $7 billion settlement in litigation on behalf of the shareholders
of Enron. In recent years, it has continued to rank first in the total amount recovered for investors.
See The Right Choice, ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP, https://www.rgrdlaw.com
/firm.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2018).
76. Burkholz Report, supra note 36, at 6–7.
77. Complaint, supra note 51.
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underwritten a public offering by Household.78 The complaint went on
to state various fraud claims on behalf of all those who had purchased
or otherwise acquired Household securities between October 23, 1997
and October 11, 2002.79
It also alleged in great detail how during that period the
defendants made a number of false representations and material
omissions about various aspects of Household’s operations.80 Those
included its lending practices, delinquency rates, and earnings from
credit-card agreements.81 Those also involved the company’s failure
to disclose its predatory lending, the concealment of its loan
delinquencies by “re-aging” or restructuring them, and a number of
other practices that Household engaged in to make it appear more
profitable than it really was.82
The complaint also alleged that Arthur Anderson had participated
in Household’s fraudulent scheme.83 It charged that the investment
banks were therefore liable in their roles as underwriters and experts
in an SEC-registered offering of securities issued by Household in
1998.84 The company used those to acquire another subprime lender,
Beneficial Finance Company.85
Amendments added to the federal securities laws by the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) include a
provision staying discovery until claims in securities fraud class
actions survive a motion to dismiss.86 That fact-finding process was
thus not available to the plaintiffs until they could overcome extensive
challenges by the defendants to the legal sufficiency of their causes of
action.
Those entailed arguments that the complaint failed to meet other
requirements of the PSLRA—specifically that the plaintiffs plead the
fraud with particularity87 and that the facts in the complaint give rise

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 14–18.
Id. at 1.
Id.
Glickenhaus & Co. v. Household Int’l, Inc., 787 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 423.
Burkholz Report, supra note 36, at 10.
Id.
Id.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(b)(3)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2012).
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1).
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to a strong inference that the defendants acted with scienter.88
Household’s motion to dismiss along those lines included a
potpourri of other contentions as well. Among them were charges that
the complaint fell short of establishing certain elements of the causes
of action that it alleged.89
Plaintiffs answered with a fifty-five page memorandum in
opposition to Household’s motion to dismiss and with extensive briefs
responding to contentions made by the other defendants.90 In all, they
cited over one hundred cases in an attempt to refute each of the
arguments made by the defendants that the litigation should not go
forward. Approximately nine months later in May 2004 the Court
ruled, upholding some of the plaintiffs’ claims and dismissing
others.91
The upshot was that Household and its officials remained in the
case.92 Arthur Anderson did as well, but since it was in the process of
dissolution because of its involvement in the Enron scandal, it settled
with the plaintiffs for $1.5 million.93 The investment bankers however
were released because the statute of limitations had run on the claims
covering their role in the fraud.94
The defendants nevertheless made two subsequent motions to
dismiss in 2005 based on cases recently decided by the U.S. Supreme
Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.95 The
ruling from the High Court in Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo,96
which dealt with loss causation, would remain significant throughout
the case and its eventual appeal.97 The trial court however denied both
motions at that time.98 It also turned aside an attempt by the defendants
to have its ruling on the Dura issue certified as an interlocutory
88. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(b)(2); see Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights,
Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 324 (2007) (holding that the inference of scienter “must be more than merely
‘reasonable’ or ‘permissible’—it must be cogent and compelling, thus strong in the light of other
explanations”).
89. Burkholz Report, supra note 36, at 11–12.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 14.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 14, 73.
94. Id. at 14.
95. Id.
96. 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
97. Burkholz Report, supra note 36, at 16.
98. Even though the Court denied those motions, its ruling did result in the shortening of the
class period in the Household action. Id. at 16–17.
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appeal.99
With the Court’s denial of the defendants’ motions to dismiss, the
stay on discovery was lifted.100 The parties then vigorously engaged
in that for over three years.101 As a result, the plaintiffs obtained over
four million pages of documents from defendants and third parties,
including extensive government reports about the defendants’
predatory lending practices.102 Those of course required a massive
amount of attorney time to examine and analyze.103
In addition, plaintiffs’ counsel took the depositions of more than
fifty former and current Household employees and issued subpoenas
for documents and depositions to dozens of third parties, almost all of
whom objected to those requests.104 The defendants in turn served
wide-ranging interrogatories, made elaborate requests for documents,
and issued numerous subpoenas for depositions of their own.105
Due to the complexities of those demands and the disputes that
arose from them, the parties made over forty motions related to
discovery.106 Many involved issues like privilege and work product
and most of them required full briefing before a U.S. Magistrate
assigned to the case could decide them.107 In addition, both parties
retained experts.108 Not surprisingly, discovery controversies about
them had to be resolved as well.109
To manage all of this the parties attended over a dozen status
conferences with either the magistrate or the trial judge and submitted
numerous reports to them in anticipation of those meetings.110 At the
close of discovery, the defendants made extensive motions for
summary judgment, which the plaintiffs answered and the Court held
in abeyance until the trial.111
Although the parties had engaged in settlement discussions
throughout this process, the defendants made no offers acceptable to
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 18.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 20–26.
Id. at 72.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 21–26.
Id. at 26–27.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 27–64.
Id. at 65–68, 70.
Id. at 69–71.
Id. at 71–72.
Id. at 73–75.
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plaintiffs.112 The case was then set for trial on March 30, 2009.113 By
that time, the parties had stipulated to class certification114 and the
defendants were winnowed down to four: Household itself and three
of its former top officers, William Aldinger, the CEO, David
Schoenholz, the CFO, and Gary Gilmer, Household’s Vice-Chairman
and President of Consumer Lending.115 By agreement, the parties had
likewise narrowed the grounds upon which the law would hold those
defendants legally culpable.116
C. The Rule 10b-5 Cause of Action
As a result, by the time of trial the potential liability of the
defendants rested in large part117 on one significant provision of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 10(b),118 and Exchange Act
Rule 10b-5119 that the Commission had made under it. Section 10(b)
is an enabling statute that grants the SEC power to make rules
prohibiting fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a
security.120 Under that authority, the Commission promulgated Rule
10b-5—a broad, “catch-all”121 regulation. Subpart two of that
provision declares it a crime to make a materially false or misleading
statement in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.122
In the post-World War II era, federal courts expanded the scope
of that rule from just a criminal provision to one that implies a civil
cause of action as well.123 Victims of securities fraud thus began using
Rule 10b-5 to bring private actions in federal court. By the mid-1970s,
112. Id. at 14546.
113. Id. at 75.
114. Glickenhaus & Co. v. Household Int’l, Inc., 787 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2015).
115. Id. at 426.
116. Burkholz Report, supra note 36, at 105.
117. Id. at 14. Plaintiffs also alleged that the individual defendants were liable under § 20(a) of
the Exchange Act, which provides liability for persons who control those who are liable under the
Act. Id. at 8.
118. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5 (2018).
119. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (2018).
120. Id.
121. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203 (1976).
122. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (2018).
123. The leading case there is Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 802–03 (E.D. Pa.
1947), modified on other grounds, 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947). Because Rule 10b-5 civil
actions are not predicated on an express provision like other causes of action in the federal securities
laws, “. . . there is ample room for litigants to assert creative and unique arguments, which makes
the study and practice of securities fraud litigation both dynamic and interesting.” STEINBERG et
AL., supra note 18, at 168.
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such suits had become a major vehicle for business litigation.
In critical remarks responding to that, Justice Rehnquist then
called them “a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a
legislative acorn”124 and also stated: “There has been widespread
recognition that litigation under Rule 10b-5 presents a danger of
vexatiousness different in degree and in kind from that which
accompanies litigation in general . . . .”125
Because of Justice Rehnquist’s comments in the Blue Chip
Stamps case126 and two other Supreme Court opinions that followed
it, which also restricted 10b-5 claims,127 it seemed the then
conservative Supreme Court might even rescind such a judicially
created extension of federal power. In a 1983 decision however the
High Court ended that speculation stating that the existence of the 10b5 civil remedy, which courts had consistently recognized for thirtyfive years, was “beyond peradventure.”128
The 10b-5 cause of action thus survived and in its contemporary
jurisprudence the Supreme Court has listed six elements that a plaintiff
must prove to recover under it.129 First, there must be a material
misrepresentation (or omission).130 Second, the plaintiff must prove
the defendants’ scienter, i.e. a wrongful state of mind.131 Third, the
material misstatement or omission must be in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security.132 Fourth, there must be a showing of
reliance, often referred to in cases involving public securities markets
(fraud-on-the-market cases) as “transaction causation.”133 Fifth, there
must be proof that the investor has suffered economic loss and, sixth,
124. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
125. Id. at 739.
126. Id. at 73132 (explaining how lower federal district courts have held that only purchasers
and sellers of securities could bring claims under 10b-5).
127. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 20507 (1976) (holding that to be liable under
10b-5, a defendant had to have acted with scienter); STEINBERG et AL., supra note 18, at 228–36;
Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 471 (1977) (holding that 10b-5 could only apply in
situations where the defendants had been guilty of making material misrepresentations or not
disclosing material facts); Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 760 (Powell, J., concurring) (noting that
Justice Harry Blackmun was a persistent dissenter throughout these opinions, at one point accusing
the majority of having a “preternatural solicitousness” for the corporate establishment).
128. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983).
129. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2407 (2014);
Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 34142 (2005).
130. Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2407.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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the plaintiff must show a causal connection between the material
misrepresentation and the decline in the value of the security.134
D. Loss Causation
It was that last element, loss causation, which proved the major
hurdle to recovery in Household, and under Rule 10b-5 the plaintiffs
had the burden to prove it.135 The federal securities laws however
contain two express civil causes of action for securities fraud and
either one would have made it easier for the plaintiffs in Household to
prevail on that issue because they both reverse the burden of proof
there.136
Section 11 of the Securities Act137 gives an express cause of
action to those who purchase securities traceable to an offering made
in an effective SEC registration statement that contains a material
misstatement. It allows them to bring the action not only versus the
issuer but also directly against a number of individuals who
participated in the offering.138 That avenue for recovery however was
inapplicable here because the Household plaintiffs who remained after
the dismissal of the investment bankers purchased their shares in the
secondary market.139
Another cause of action, § 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act,140
appears to go beyond § 11 however and affords a broader remedy for
all those who suffer losses because of materially false or misleading
statements made in a “prospectus.”141 In a 1995 opinion,142 however,
the Supreme Court limited the meaning of that to solely a selling
document used in a public offering, which was not the case in the
Household action.
In addition § 12(a)(2) contains a privity requirement giving a
remedy only against sellers of securities.143 The High Court again gave
134. Id.
135. Glickenhaus & Co. v. Household Int’l, Inc., 787 F.3d 408, 415 (7th Cir. 2015).
136. See Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2012); id. § 12(a)(2).
137. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2012).
138. Id.
139. Burkholz Report, supra note 36, at 14.
140. 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2).
141. Id.
142. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 584 (1995). For the author’s criticism of that case,
see Daniel J. Morrissey, Shareholder Litigation After the Meltdown, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 531, 565–
67 (2012).
143. 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2).
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a narrow meaning to that word, defining a “seller” as just one who
passes title to a security or receives a financial benefit for
recommending its purchase.144 The plaintiffs in Household could thus
not use § 12(a)(2) on those grounds either because they bought their
shares in the open market, not directly from the company.
That was unfortunate because both § 11 and § 12(a)(2) offer
defrauded shareholders much better vehicles for recovery on the issue
of causation.145 To avoid liability under both, the defendants must
show that the plaintiffs’ losses resulted from factors other than its false
statements.146 By contrast, the burden is on 10b-5 plaintiffs to prove
causation in two ways.
First, they must show that they relied on the defendants’
misrepresentation or omission in purchasing the securities.147 That
satisfies one aspect of those requirements usually called “transaction
causation.”148 In other words, “but for” the misrepresentations or
omissions, the plaintiffs would not have bought the stock or paid such
a high price for it.149
In the context of a class action such as the Household case, there
may be tens of thousands of shareholders. It would obviously be
prohibitively expensive for the plaintiffs’ lawyers to adduce testimony
from each purchasing stockholder that the defendants’ falsehoods
misled her into paying a higher price for her shares than was justified.
To overcome that difficulty courts have adopted a presumption
144. Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 649 (1988).
145. In addition to the causation issue, defendants seeking to avoid liability under both § 11
and § 12(a)(2) have the burden of proving that they were not negligent in providing untruthful
information to the purchasers of their shares. Securities Act of 1933 § 11(b)(3), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77k(b)(3) (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 77l (a)(2).
By contrast, Rule 10b-5 puts the burden to prove that crucial state-of-mind element on the
plaintiffs. See STEINBERG et AL., supra note 18, at 228. Even though Rule 10b-5 contains no
provision requiring a showing of the defendants’ intentions for liability, the Court in Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) found that the language used in its enabling statute, § 10(b),
requires more than mere negligence for civil liability. See STEINBERG et AL., supra note 18, at 236.
In addition, under the PSLRA, defrauded shareholders must first plead facts, without the benefit of
discovery, that create a strong inference that the defendants acted with scienter; then, at trial, the
shareholders must prove scienter by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 171, 227.
146. Securities Act of 1933 § 11(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (2012); id. § 12(b); Akerman v. Oryx
Commc’ns, Inc., 810 F.2d 336, 341 (2d Cir. 1987).
147. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 159 (2008).
148. See Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co. (Halliburton I), 563 U.S. 804, 812 (2011);
Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005).
149. In cases involving material omissions, courts will presume that a reasonable investor might
have considered those facts significant, thus satisfying the reliance element. Affiliated Ute Citizens
of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153–54 (1972).
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called fraud-on-the-market that may establish that each class member
relied on the stock’s price as an accurate indicator of its value.150 That
theory is a corollary to an economic principal called the efficient
market hypothesis. It holds that the price of a share in a closely
followed and heavily traded stock reflects the market’s best estimate
of its worth at any point in time.151
False information however skews that assessment, distorting the
stock’s true value and usually causing share purchasers to pay more
than they should. The Supreme Court accepted that assumption in
1988 in a case, Basic, Inc. v. Levinson.152 More than a quarter century
later, in 2014, the High Court revisited it in the Halliburton II case
which contested its continuing viability.153 The Court there turned
away that challenge and reaffirmed the usefulness of the fraud-on-themarket theory.154 It did rule, however, that defendants could introduce
evidence at the class certification stage that the presumption was
unwarranted in a particular case.155
Because of a Supreme Court case decided in 2005, however, a
second aspect of the plaintiff’s proof of causation—that the plaintiff’s
losses actually resulted from the falsehoods—became more difficult.
The PSLRA already required that plaintiffs prove “loss causation”156
as well as the “transaction causation” just discussed.157 The decision,
Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo,158 however, reversed the
holding from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit that allowed
the plaintiff to satisfy that requirement by simply alleging that a
misrepresentation inflated the price of a security at the time it was
150. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241–42 (1988).
151. Eugene Fama, an economics professor at the University of Chicago, is known as the
“father of the efficient market theory.” Eugene Fama, King of Predictable Markets, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 26, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/27/business /eugene-fama-king-of-predictablemarkets.html. In 2013, he was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics. Id.
With these remarks, one commentator summed up how this presumption eliminates the
need to show that each investor has relied on the fraudulent statements. “The doctrine [of fraud-onthe-market] affords plaintiffs in a section 10(b) action the benefit of two presumptions: first, that
any material information—including false information—introduced into an ‘open and developed
market’ influences stock prices, and second, that investors who transact in such a market ‘rely’ on
stock prices when they purchase at the market price.” Lipton, supra note 26, at 101.
152. 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988).
153. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014).
154. Id. at 2410.
155. Id. at 2414–15.
156. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2012).
157. See Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153–54 (1972).
158. 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
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made.159
The defendant company in Dura was charged with making false
statements about its medical product.160 When the truth came out, its
stock price dropped precipitously but it recovered all that value a week
later. While conceding that an inflated purchase price may “touch
upon”161 a later economic loss, the Court held that alone was not
sufficient to show that the falsehood was the proximate cause of the
shareholder’s economic loss.162
More facts therefore would have to be plead and proven to
establish that element. Accordingly, the plaintiffs in Household
engaged a witness who was an expert in law and economic theory to
show that the decline in the worth of their shares resulted from the
defendants’ falsehoods.163 While the Court of Appeals found his
testimony generally probative, it reversed the initial verdict in the
plaintiffs’ favor because it said the expert’s opinion lacked specificity
in certain areas.164
Another aspect of 10b-5 jurisprudence served as a barrier to the
plaintiffs’ success as well. It arose from a 2011 Supreme Court
decision, Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders,165
where the High Court gave a narrow, literal ruling in interpreting
liability under Rule 10b-5(2). It requires that to be liable, a defendant
must “make” a false statement.166 In Janus, the investment adviser of
a mutual fund controlled the company and drafted the allegedly false
and misleading prospectus that the fund used to sell its shares.167
The Court nevertheless found that the adviser was not the author
of the prospectus because it was a statement of the fund.168 The adviser
therefore could not have “made” any falsehoods that it contained. In
the same manner, Household officials who merely furnished false
information for a statement ultimately attributed to either the
corporation or another officer could therefore not be liable for

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at 338.
Id. at 339.
Id. at 343.
Id.
Burkholz Report, supra note 36, at 65.
Glickenhaus & Co. v. Household Int’l, Inc., 787 F.3d 408, 423 (7th Cir. 2015).
564 U.S. 135, 144 (2011).
Id. at 149.
Id. at 135.
Id. at 146–47.

(9)51.1_MORRISEY (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

2/24/2019 3:44 PM

LOSS CAUSATION IN SECURITIES LITIGATION

221

wrongdoing under 10b-5.169
E. Trial Preparation
At a status hearing on June 30, 2008, the case was set for trial nine
months later, on March 30, 2009.170 Given the tens of thousands of
documents that had surfaced during discovery and the more than fifty
potential witnesses deposed, preparation for trial was arduous and
required extensive effort. The strategy included culling documents and
witnesses for presentation at trial, issuing subpoenas, and preparing
various motions in limine.171 In addition, the lawyers had to prepare
for voir dire and draft verdict forms and jury instructions.172
By the end of February 2009, a twenty-person team of lawyers,
forensic accountants, and support personnel relocated to Chicago to
prepare for trial.173 Defense firms made preparations that involved
even larger numbers of attorneys and their assistants.174 Lawyers for
the parties then entered into wide-ranging negotiations to draft a pretrial order.175 Earlier they had been able to stipulate to class
certification and they ultimately agreed on a host of other evidentiary
and procedural matters as well. Those included a description of the
case that they would present to the jury.176
There was however lengthy pretrial sparring between the parties
which included unsuccessful motions for evidentiary sanctions that the
plaintiffs brought against the defendants for allegedly failing to
preserve relevant documents. The parties also battled over the
qualifications of expert witnesses, the relevance of certain material
that might prove prejudicial to either party, and various matters which
the defendants claimed were privileged.177 All this culminated in a
pretrial conference that lasted over the course of eight days where the
parties settled some of those disputes, the Court decided others, and
still more were designated for rulings at trial.178

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Glickenhaus & Co., 787 F.3d at 426.
Burkholz Report, supra note 36, at 76.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 128.
Id. at 7677.
Id. at 80.
Id. at 7690.
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F. The Trial
The trial began at the end of March 2009 and lasted over five
weeks.179 Twenty-two witnesses testified, including each of the three
individual Defendants still in the case.180 On cross-examination
William Aldinger—Household’s former CEO—made the bombshell
admission that disclosures in the Company’s 2001 annual report were
materially false and misleading.181
Plaintiffs also presented forceful evidence of Household’s
predatory lending, which included showing the jury training videos
made for the Company’s employees that instructed them how to
engage in those unscrupulous practices.182 They also laid out how the
Defendants manipulated the quality of their loan portfolios by
disguising customer delinquencies.183 In addition, even though the
Court had earlier excluded introduction of Household’s settlements
with state authorities, the Plaintiffs were nonetheless able to get those
into evidence after the Defendants opened the door to their
admission.184
After closing argument, the Court instructed the jurors that they
were to determine which, if any, of the forty statements in issue made
by the Defendants were materially false.185 If any were, they were then
asked to identify which of the four Defendants were responsible for
them and to find if those entities or persons made them knowingly or
recklessly.186
The jurors returned a verdict that seventeen of the statements
were indeed materially false, all of which were made between March
23, 2001 and October 11, 2002.187 As perhaps a compromise,
however, they found that the other twenty-three statements made
earlier in the class period were not.188 Since it established liability, the
jury then had to address the question of causation and determine how
Household’s stock was overpriced due to those falsehoods.189 The
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id. at 90.
Id.
Id. at 91.
Id. at 136.
Id. at 87.
Id. at 91.
Id. at 147.
Glickenhaus & Co. v. Household Int’l, Inc., 787 F.3d 408, 41314 (7th Cir. 2015).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 414.
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plaintiffs’ expert had presented two alternatives for that at trial.190
The first was called the “specific-disclosure” model and reckoned
damages based on fourteen separate disclosure events.191 The net total
effect of those on Household’s shares, as established by the plaintiffs’
expert, was a decline of $7.97—indicating that the misrepresentations
inflated the company’s stock by that amount.192 The jurors were thus
given a table to complete if they accepted that model which would list
the amount Household’s stock was overpriced on a given day during
the period of the falsehoods—with the maximum amount being
$7.97.193
The jury however had an alternative way to calculate damages
that the plaintiffs’ expert also presented to it called the “leakage”
model.194 It was premised on the belief that the truth about a
company’s inflated stock price may become known not just from
significantly specific corrective disclosures but also from other
information that may leak out to some market participants before its
general release.195
In the Household case, that may have begun as early as the
announcements of actions by the State Attorneys General and
continued with other news about the company’s true situation from
various sources.196 The cumulative effect of all those disclosures—the
net sum of the resulting price declines—would compound the drop in
Household’s stock price beyond what the specific disclosure model
allowed.197
The jury adopted the leakage model and based on the calculations
presented there by the Plaintiffs’ expert it determined that the
falsehoods overpriced Household’s stock by $23.94.198 It entered that
on its table, added the amounts for each day during the relevant period,
and came back with what the Court of Appeals called “an enormous
judgment for the Plaintiffs”—a $1.48 billion verdict that measured the
inflation in the price that the plaintiffs had to pay for their shares.199
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id.
Id. at 415–16.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 417 n.4.
Id. at 416.
Id. at 41718.
Id. at 412, 431 n.14.
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That amount increased to $2.46 billion when prejudgment interest was
added.200
As the Appellate Court also noted, that judgment was “apparently
one of the largest to date.”201 The jury also apportioned those damages
among the three defendants—55% to the company and the remaining
45% among the three individuals (20% to Aldinger, 15% to
Schoenholz, and 10% to Gilmer).202
G. Post-Trial and Phase Two
Despite the Plaintiffs’ significant victory at trial, the case was
hardly over. Household made repeated statements that it expected to
prevail either in post-trial motions or on appeal.203 The company’s
parent, HSBC, did the same.204 Several months after trial, therefore,
the Defendants filed a sixty page motion for judgment as a matter of
law and alternatively a 116 page motion for a new trial.205
There they made twelve separate arguments including that the
plaintiffs had failed to prove loss causation and materiality.206 They
also disputed the plaintiffs’ claims about predatory lending, asserted
that the jury’s verdict was inconsistent, and claimed the Court’s
evidentiary rulings were unfair.207 Plaintiffs of course vigorously
contested all of those points and prevailed when the trial judge denied
them as moot and premature.208
The Court then embarked on what it called Phase II of the trial to
fix damages for each class member who had purchased their shares
between March 23, 2001 and the date the damage period ended on
October 11, 2002 or who had owned some stock before then and sold
it during the damage period.209 To establish them, the Court set up a
three-fold approach.
(1) If the stockholders bought their shares when the Company was
making false statements and did not sell, their damages would be the
200. Id. at 431 n.14.
201. Id. at 412.
202. Id. at 428. The jury found that Aldinger and Schoenholz were also liable as controlling
persons of each other, Household, and Gilmer under § 20(a) of the Exchange Act.
203. Burkholz Report, supra note 36, at 94.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 93.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 9394.
209. Id. at 92, 95.
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amount of artificial inflation at the time of their purchase.210 (2) If they
purchased their stock before the class period and sold during the
damage period at a gain or loss, their damages would be their out-ofpocket losses less any gain they obtained or loss they avoided because
of the artificial inflation at the time of sale.211 (3) For shares bought
during the damage period, their damages would be the stock’s
artificial inflation at the time of purchase less the artificial inflation at
the time of sale.212
The Court also set out a protocol for Phase II. It gave the
defendants the ability to rebut the Basic presumption that their
falsehoods had created a “fraud on the market” thus causing the
plaintiffs to purchase their shares at an inflated price.213 The first two
ways that the defendants could do that under Basic were by showing
that the market knew the truth all along or that news of the fraud had
entered the market and dissipated the impact of the falsehoods.214 The
Court ruled, however, that the jury’s findings had precluded them.215
The defendants therefore could now only rebut the “fraud-on-themarket” presumption if they could “show that individual plaintiffs
bought or sold Household stock without relying on the integrity of the
market.”216
To determine that, the Court approved a “Notice and Claim
Questionnaire” to be sent to the class members.217 It asked them if they
would have bought Household’s stock even if they had known its price
was falsely inflated.218 If they answered “no,” they would be entitled
to recovery.219 If they answered “yes,” their recovery would be subject
to further proceedings.220
The Court allowed the defendants to take additional discovery
from some plaintiffs along those lines to see if they had not relied on
Household’s stock price to purchase their shares.221 Following up on
210. Burkholz Report, supra note 36, at 95.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Glickenhaus & Co. v. Household Int’l, Inc., 787 F.3d 408, 430 (7th Cir. 2015); Basic, Inc.
v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241 (1988).
214. Glickenhaus & Co., 787 F.3d at 429.
215. Id. at 430.
216. Id.
217. Burkholz Report, supra note 36, at 95.
218. Glickenhaus & Co., 787 F.3d at 430.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 431.
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that, the defendants then served ninety-eight class members with
interrogatories, requests for documents, and notices for depositions.222
When plaintiffs’ attorneys objected to such broad demands, the court
limited the number of depositions to just fifteen of the large
institutional investors.223 It did however permit as much written
discovery from class members as the defendants wanted to do.224
After extensive arguments on how to deal with information
garnered from that process, the Court ruled that it would award
damages to all class members if they satisfied two factors indicating
that they relied on the integrity of Household’s market price in
purchasing their shares.225 Those were: (1) they stated on the
questionnaire that they would not have bought the stock if they had
known its price was falsely inflated and (2) no information turned up
in discovery to contest that.226
“When the time for answering the court’s preliminary questions
had expired, a large number of the class members still had not
responded.”227 The Court then divided that group into two classes
depending on whether their claims were more or less than $250,000.228
Class members above that amount would be required to answer the
questionnaire.229
If those class members answered “no” they would be entitled to
recovery, assuming there were no other objections to their claims.230
But if they indicated they might have bought Household’s stock
anyway even if they had known of the company’s misrepresentations,
the extent of their reliance on the integrity of the market price would
have to be resolved in a Phase II trial.231 For those class members who
failed to answer the questionnaire, the defendants would be entitled to
judgment on their claims.232
The Court also selected a Special Master to determine whether
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Burkholz Report, supra note 36, at 96–97.
225. Glickenhaus & Co., 787 F.3d at 431; Burkholz Report, supra note 36, at 99–100.
226. Glickenhaus & Co., 787 F.3d at 431.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. Ultimately, the trial court required all class members, regardless of their claim amount,
to answer the questionnaire. Order at 1, Lawrence E. Jaffe Pension Plan v. Household Int’l, Inc.,
No. 02-C-5893 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 6, 2012).
230. Burkholz Report, supra note 36, at 100.
231. Id.
232. Id.
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the claims of particular class members were valid or would have to be
tried under the criteria the Court had established for awards.233 To
accomplish that, elaborate processes were set up to communicate with
class members and financial intermediaries who held their shares.234
All that took thousands of hours.235
At the end of the second response period, 10,902 claimants
answered “no” to the Court’s questions and they had no other
ministerial objections to their claims outstanding.236 The Court
therefore entered a partial judgment in their favor.237 With the addition
of prejudgment interest, that amount totaled $2.46 billion.238 Other
claimants had answered “yes” to the court’s questionnaire and still
others had failed to answer it.239 At the time of the appeal, however,
there were objections outstanding to over 20,000 other claims.240 Most
of those belonged either to those who had failed to answer the
questionnaire or whose claims were valued at less than $250,000.241
H. The Appeal
The oral argument there was held on May 29, 2014 and featured
two jurists whom presidential candidate Donald Trump had listed as
potential Supreme Court nominees.242 One was Paul Clement, a
former solicitor general of the United States under President George
W. Bush who argued for the defendants,243 and the other was a judge
with an equally illustrious conservative pedigree: Diane Sykes.244 The
two other members of the panel were William Bauer, a Republican

233. Id. The defendants objected to the validity of approximately 30,000 claims; the Special
Master was tasked with resolving those objections. Id. at 107.
234. Id. at 104.
235. Id.
236. Glickenhaus & Co. v. Household Int’l, Inc., 787 F.3d 408, 431 (7th Cir. 2015).
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 431–32. See also infra note 324 and accompanying text for a discussion of how those
claims were ultimately involved in the settlement of the case.
242. Jeremy Diamond, Trump Unveils His Potential Supreme Court Nominees, CNN POLITICS,
https://www.cnn.com/2016/05/18/politics/donald-trump-supreme-court-nominees/index.html (last
updated May 18, 2016, 10:38 PM).
243. Professional Profile of Paul D. Clement – Partner, KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP,
https://www.kirkland.com/sitecontent.cfm?contentID=220&itemID=12018 (last visited Oct. 8,
2018).
244. Glickenhaus & Co., 787 F.3d at 412; Diamond, supra note 242.
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appointee and former prosecutor,245 then a senior judge in his late 80s,
and Michael Kanne, another conservative,246 in his mid-70s. Michael
Dowd, a name partner in the plaintiffs’ firm, argued for the
shareholders.247
The defendants sought to overturn the lower court’s verdict on
three grounds. First, they challenged the Court’s instruction to the jury
on what it means to “make” a false statement.248 Second, they claimed
that the trial judge deprived them of a meaningful opportunity to rebut
the presumption of reliance.249 And third, they argued that the
plaintiffs had not proven that their damages were a result of the false
statements attributed to the defendants.250 This last issue of loss
causation proved most significant and ultimately led to a partial
reversal.251
The controlling precedent there, as has been stated, was the High
Court’s decision in Dura Pharmaceuticals.252 It held that for a
recovery under Rule 10b-5 plaintiffs must show not only that the
falsehoods caused them to buy the stock at an inflated price
(“transaction” or “but-for” causation) but also that they suffered
financial damages because of their purchase (“loss causation”).253
That meant that the shareholders had to demonstrate that the
misrepresentations artificially increased the price of the stock they
bought and then the revelation of those falsehoods made it drop.
Judge Sykes, writing for the Household Court, gave a lucid
description of how the plaintiffs could prove that. Because many
factors can influence a stock’s movement, she said, it is hard to
measure how much a particular misrepresentation or omission falsely
increases its price.254 The better way to determine that is to see what
happens to the stock’s worth when the truth comes out.255 As she

245. Glickenhaus & Co., 787 F.3d at 412; Profile of Bauer, William Joseph, FED. JUDICIAL
CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/bauer-william-joseph (last visited Oct. , 2018).
246. Glickenhaus & Co., 787 F.3d at 412; Profile of Kanne, Michael Stephen, FED. JUDICIAL
CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/kanne-michael-stephen (last visited Oct. 12, 2018).
247. Glickenhaus & Co., 787 F.3d at 412.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 429.
250. Id. at 412.
251. Id.
252. 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
253. Id. at 345–46.
254. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
255. Id.
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succinctly put it, “What goes up [falsely], must come down.”256 In
other words, the decline in a share’s price, which follows the
disclosure of falsehoods, is probably the best indicator of how much it
was overvalued.
The Court then acknowledged that the plaintiffs had engaged a
renowned expert, Professor Daniel Fischel, to establish that.257 As has
been discussed,258 he presented two different approaches to the jury—
the “specific disclosure” model and the “leakage” model. The latter
theory, which the jury accepted and used as the basis for its verdict,
was first articulated in a 1990 article.259
There, two law and economic scholars asserted that specific
relevant information about an event can underestimate the economic
importance of it on the price of a firm’s stock.260 A better way to
account fully for its impact on the share price would be to “extend the
observation window surrounding the disclosure date.”261 That should,
wrote the authors, begin when one can be “reasonably confident that
no significant information leakage has occurred” and end when one
“feels confident that most of the information is publicly available.”262
Following Fischel’s use of that reasoning, Judge Sykes approved
of how the jurors had applied it in the Household case.263 Fischel had
presented them with the date of the California suit against the
Company as the possible beginning of the leakage period so that they
might reckon the drop in the stock’s price from that time.264 He told
them they could then find that the disclosure period ended when
Household settled the multi-state litigation.265
Following that, the panel reasoned that the decline of $23.94 per
share which the jury found using the leakage model was a good
measure of how Household’s falsehoods affected the price of its
stock.266 As has been described,267 that resulted in much larger
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
259. Bradford Cornell & R. Gregory Morgan, Using Finance Theory to Measure Damages in
Fraud on the Market Cases, 37 UCLA L. REV. 883, 888 (1990).
260. Id.
261. Id. at 906.
262. Id.
263. Glickenhaus & Co. v. Household Int’l, Inc., 787 F.3d 408, 419 (7th Cir. 2015).
264. Burkholz Report, supra note 36, at 65.
265. Id.
266. Glickenhaus & Co., 787 F.3d at 417.
267. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
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damages than the specific disclosure model. That only included
declines from dates on which Household’s stock price moved in a
statistically significant manner different from the market generally and
its industry peers.268 It therefore excluded price declines on other days
when news regarding Household continued to leak into the market.269
The Court then acknowledged there was little case law formally
embracing the leakage model—most likely, as it said, “because these
cases rarely make it to trial.”270 Yet Judge Sykes astutely found that
the Supreme Court had implicitly accepted it in Dura Pharmaceuticals
with its observation there that some shareholders may have no
damages in fraud cases if they sell their shares before the truth about
corporate falsehoods begins to “leak out.”271
After thus whole-heartedly accepting the leakage model, the
Court of Appeals then brushed off the defendants’ principal objection
to it—“that it made no attempt to prove how Household’s stock price
became inflated in the first instance.”272 The Court answered that by
restating its basic insight on how shareholder-plaintiffs can prove loss
causation.273
They can do that, the Court repeated, by showing how the stock
dropped as the truth gradually came out.274 Then in response to the
defendants’ argument the panel stated, “How the stock became
inflated in the first place is irrelevant because each subsequent false
statement prevented the price from falling to its true value and
therefore caused the price to remain elevated.”275
More convincing to the court however were the defendants’
arguments that the leakage theory as presented to the jury did not
account for “firm-specific, non-fraud factors that may have affected
the decline in Household’s stock price.”276 Fischel’s models, said the
Court, did control for “market and industry factors and general trends
268. Glickenhaus & Co., 787 F.3d at 415–16.
269. See id. at 416.
270. Id. (reporting that less than ½ of the 1% of securities class actions filed make it to trial);
see also Mustokoff, supra note 33.
271. Glickenhaus & Co., 787 F.3d at 422 (citing Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336,
342 (2005)).
272. Id. at 418.
273. Id. at 419.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 418; see also Mustokoff, supra note 33, at 194 (This has been called the “price
maintenance” theory of loss causation, i.e. the plaintiff does not have to show how each new
misrepresentation skewed the price of the stock).
276. Glickenhaus & Co., 787 F.3d at 421.
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in the economy” but not for other factors specific to Household.277
The Court noted that Fischel testified to those possibilities in a
general sense and ruled them out.278 The panel also acknowledged that
the defendants did not cross-examine Fischel on that opinion.279 In
addition, the defendants did not themselves identify such information
that might have affected Household’s stock.280
Yet that was not enough, said the Court, to eliminate other firm
specific, non-fraud related factors from being possible causes for the
stock’s decline.281 To establish loss causation under the leakage model
there had to be “non-conclusory” testimony to that effect.282 The Court
therefore reversed and ordered a retrial on that matter.283
Nevertheless, the Court’s general approval of the leakage method
for proving damages gave the plaintiffs a major victory and it broke
new ground to advance these actions, making them potentially more
remunerative for shareholders victimized by fraud. Yet by demanding
additional proof to rule out other factors that might have caused the
stock’s drop, the panel stopped short of affirming the judgment of the
district court and giving the plaintiffs an immediate win.
Perhaps the Court just wanted the plaintiffs’ lawyers to work a
little harder for their billion-dollar recovery! In any event, its
requirement for more particularized proof that no firm-specific, nonfraudulent information affected the decline in Household’s stock put a
limit on the leakage model.284
The other two issues that defendants raised on appeal proved
much less consequential. Since the trial, the Supreme Court had
decided the Janus case. As has been stated, it held that only those who
have the ultimate authority for false statements can “make” them.285
Therefore, the trial court’s pre-Janus instructions to the jury which
made the defendants liable if they merely furnished language or
277. Id.; see also Mustokoff, supra note 33, at 215 (“The court found that Fischel’s attempt to
rule out the effects of non-fraud factors was inadequate, explaining that Fischel’s leakage model
‘needed to eliminate any firm-specific, non-fraud related factors that might have contributed to the
stock’s decline’”).
278. Glickenhaus & Co., 787 F.3d at 421.
279. Id. at 421–22.
280. Id. at 422.
281. Id. at 420.
282. Id. at 422.
283. Id. at 433.
284. Mustokoff, supra note 33, at 219.
285. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135, 142, 144 (2011).
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information that ended up being disseminated to the public were not
enough to satisfy that standard.
Certain of the individual defendants therefore could be entitled to
a new trial on the issue of whether they had “made” certain false
statements attributed to them. Before the re-trial, however, the parties
ironed that issue out by agreeing which statements by the individual
defendants made them potentially liable under the Janus test.286
In addition, the Appellate Court dismissed the defendants’
arguments that it should invalidate Phase II of the trial because that
process did not allow them to rebut Basic’s presumption about the
plaintiffs’ reliance on Household’s market price.287 To the contrary,
the panel found that the questionnaire sent to each shareholder
plaintiff, with the availability of follow-up discovery, was an accurate
and practical way to determine that.288
The Court of Appeals instead faulted the defendants for merely
lodging general objections to the pragmatic approach that the trial
court had adopted to resolve that issue.289 It turned aside their protests
with this terse comment, “[the defendants] don’t specify what the
Court should have done differently.”290
I. Preparations for Retrial and Settlement
The unfortunate result for the plaintiffs from all this however was
that they had to retry the case. Despite the panel’s acceptance of the
leakage method and its approval of the claims process, the Court of
Appeals did not affirm the judgement.291 Instead, it remanded the
matter for a new trial, compelling the shareholders to litigate the
damage issues again.292 This time their burden was greater. They
would have to present more particularized evidence that the
defendants’ falsehoods—not other firm specific, non-fraudulent
factors—caused the decline in the value of their shares.293
On remand, the case was re-assigned to another U.S. District
Judge, Jorge Alonso, who had assumed his position just a year
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

Burkholz Report, supra note 36, at 125.
Id. at 94–95.
Id. at 95.
Glickenhaus & Co. v. Household Int’l, Inc., 787 F.3d 408, 432 (7th Cir. 2015).
Id.
Id. at 433.
Id.
Id. at 415.
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earlier.294 His previous legal career had principally entailed criminal
work, first as a public defender and then as a state court trial judge.295
Judge Alonso’s first rulings re-enforced the daunting task that the
plaintiffs’ lawyers again faced.
He held that plaintiffs would once more have to show that the
defendants’ misstatements were “a substantial cause of the economic
losses suffered by the Plaintiffs.”296 They would also have to reprove
“the amount of per share damages, if any, to which plaintiffs were
entitled.”297 The Court did however rule that the plaintiffs would not
have to show the defendants’ statements were fraudulent or that they
made them with scienter.298 The findings from the first trial that the
defendants’ made those falsehoods knowingly or recklessly would
stand.299
Since the plaintiffs did not prevail on appeal, the defendants
claimed they were entitled to the costs of that proceeding—most
significantly, the $13,281,282.00 premium they had to expend for a
bond guaranteeing payment of the judgment.300 Despite arguments
made by the plaintiffs’ lawyers, which included that such a ruling
would chill future class action suits, the Court ordered the plaintiffs to
reimburse the defendants for the full amount, more than $13
million.301
An eight-figure payment like that would break the back of almost
all other law firms who routinely take these cases on a contingent fee
basis and agree to bear all their costs. Yet to show its full commitment
to the case Robbins Geller immediately wired the full amount—more
than $13 million—to the defendants.302 Because of the magnitude of

294. Burkholz Report, supra note 36, at 117; Profile of Alonso, Jorge Luis, FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/alonso-jorge-luis (last visited Oct. 9, 2018).
295. Profile of Alonso, Jorge Luis, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/
alonso-jorge-luis (last visited Oct. 9, 2018).
296. Burkholz Report, supra note 36, at 117–18.
297. Id. at 118
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 118–19.
302. Plaintiffs’ Motion & Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for an Award of
Attorneys’ Fees & Expenses & Reasonable Costs & Expenses for Lead Plaintiffs at 3, Lawrence
E. Jaffe Pension Plan v. Household Int’l, Inc., 2016 WL 10571774 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 10, 2016) (No.
02-C-5893) (“Demonstrating their resolve and commitment, Lead Counsel refused to fold and
instead paid the $13.28 million out-of-pocket and prepared the case for a second trial.”).
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that sum, the law firm’s swift response astounded Judge Alonso.303
The parties again began making extensive preparations for trial,
which the Court set to begin within a year on June 6, 2016.304 Professor
Fischel then started to refashion his opinion to meet the concerns of
the appellate court. That entailed reviewing his original findings to see
if there were any changes in Household’s stock during the relevant
period that might be due to firm-specific, non-fraudulent
information.305
At trial, Fischel had testified that he assumed that any changes in
Household’s stock price, other than those explained by market and
industry trends, were caused by fraud-related disclosures.306 His
revised report however was more specific. Now reviewing
information in the market during the twenty-seven disclosure dates he
had previously identified, he concluded that as to all but one there was
no cause for the stock’s decline other than leakage of the fraud.307
The defendants in turn retained three experts to dispute Fischel’s
new opinion.308 One was the self-same Bradford Cornell, the lead
author of the article that had first advanced the leakage method.309 The
defendants’ experts roundly criticized Fischel, arguing that numerous
other items of information could have produced the decline in
Household’s shares.310 Professor Cornell also asserted that Fischel
misapplied his methodology.311
The defendants then moved to exclude Fischel’s opinion.312 Judge
Alonso however ruled that the plaintiffs had presented sufficient proof
to meet the appellate court’s requirements about the absence of firmspecific, non-fraudulent factors that could have contributed to the
decline in the price of Household’s shares.313 The defendants would
then have to refute that at the new trial.314
In May 2016 then, a team of fourteen Robbins Geller attorneys,
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.

Judge Alonso shared that impression with the author of this Article.
Burkholz Report, supra note 36, at 118.
Id. at 119.
Mustokoff, supra note 33, at 215.
Id. at 217.
Burkholz Report, supra note 36, at 119.
Id. at 119–20.
Id.
Id. at 120.
Id.
Id. at 123–24.
Id. at 124.
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other professionals, and support staff returned to Chicago and began
engaging in lengthy preparations for the retrial.315 In anticipation of
that, the parties made a number of motions in limine.316 Some of them
involved questions about whether certain findings from the first trial
could be considered proven or would have to be retried.317 Others
concerned evidentiary issues.318
Importantly, for the Lead Plaintiff to give the new jury a flavor of
Household’s fraud, the Court ruled that it would again allow the
introduction of certain material that showed Household’s predatory
lending practices.319 That included the training video used by the
Company for its new employees that promoted such unscrupulous
conduct.320
In the midst of all this pretrial sparring mediated settlement
negotiations continued.321 Even though the plaintiffs had prevailed at
the original trial on the issue of loss causation, they faced substantial
risks that the new jury would not again find for them on that crucial
element.322 Yet even if it did, the second jury might not fix damages
by using the leakage model, as had the first jury, but instead might use
the specific-disclosure method that would result in a much smaller
verdict.323
In addition, even if plaintiffs were successful in achieving a
substantial win as they did in the original trial, they would still be
facing another appeal that would certainly delay the ultimate outcome
of the case. Worse, a new appellate decision might even undo the
plaintiffs’ success as had happened in the first round of the litigation.
The plaintiffs however were not without some leverage of their
own in the settlement talks. As the Appellate Court noted, thousands
of claims remained unresolved—most involving situations where
class members had failed to answer the Court’s questions or where
claims were valued at less than $250,000.324 A finding that those were
meritorious and entitled to pre-judgment interest could increase the
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.

Id. at 127.
Id. at 128.
Id. at 131–38.
Id.
Id. at 131–32.
Id. at 136.
Id. at 145.
Id. at 149.
Id. at 149–50.
Glickenhaus & Co. v. Household Int’l, Inc., 787 F.3d 408, 431 (7th Cir. 2015).
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plaintiffs’ recovery well beyond the $2.46 billion judgment that
resulted from the first round of litigation.
With all that at stake, Judge Alonso was happy when he came into
his chambers the morning of trial and saw a sticky-note on his chair
telling him the case had been resolved.325 It had settled at four that
morning for $1.575 billion—the largest securities fraud class action
recovery ever following a trial.326 Depending on the model used, the
class members would recover an astonishing amount—between 75%
of their damages (if the jury adopted the Specific Disclosure Model)
and 252% (if the jury used the Leakage Model).327
J. Reflections
The result of this litigation was thus a grand success for the class
members, thanks to the skill and persistence of their lead counsel, the
Robbins Geller law firm. Yet because of procedural challenges by an
army of lawyers for the defendants and the exercise of their appellate
rights, it took the defrauded shareholders fourteen years from the
commencement of their suit to achieve this outcome. If there is truth
in the maxim “justice delayed is justice denied,” this case may be a
prime example of that unfairness!
Put simply, if we accept the jury’s finding that the defendants
cheated 30,000 of their shareholders by rigging Household’s financial
statements and causing them to pay more for their shares than they
should have, why couldn’t our legal system have provided those
stockholders a speedier remedy? For sure, the wheels of justice grind
slowly, but fourteen years?
To that end, the remarks by a renowned jurist, Judge Richard
Posner now retired from the federal appellate bench are instructive.
He would greatly pare down the rules of civil procedure and require
that legal briefs be shorter, without exaggeration or emphasis on minor
points.328 Along those lines, he has stated that he decides cases in this
manner: “The way I approach a case is by asking myself, ‘What would
be a common sense result, forgetting about the law? You have a
problem: What’s the best solution based on basic moral values,

325.
326.
327.
328.

From a conversation between Judge Alonso and the author.
Reply Memo, supra note 45, at 1.
Id. at 4.
Cooper, supra note 11.
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economic insights, whatever makes sense.”329
Much of the unwarranted delay in this case came from the
extensive motions to dismiss made and briefed exhaustively by the
defendants. Of course, those charged with wrongdoing should have
the opportunity to test the legal sufficiency of the accusations against
them and the legal rules governing securities litigation are certainly
complex. Yet how much of the argumentation in a case like this
legitimately serves that purpose? Often it is just a way for well-funded
defendants (and their lawyers who are paid handsome hourly sums) to
grind down plaintiffs or deter them all together from bringing these
suits.
In addition, the discovery in this case went on for years. That
process should also be streamlined.330 Once again, however, such
reforms must recognize that plaintiffs have a legitimate need to dig out
significant facts relating to their cases. For instance, it was important
for the shareholders here to compel disclosure of training videos
instructing Household’s salesforce to engage in predatory lending
practices.331
III. CONCLUSION
The Household case demonstrates that it is possible for defrauded
shareholders to gain ample redress for their losses even when
defendants with great resources vigorously resist claims against them.
Plaudits go to the Robbins Geller law firm for achieving this notable
victory for their clients and affirming that the law can produce such a
satisfying result even when opposed by well-funded and well-advised
wrongdoers.
We hear a lot about how class action suits serve only to enrich
plaintiffs’ attorneys, while providing very little for the claimants
themselves. The good and relentless work of the plaintiffs’ lawyers
329. Id.; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEM OF JURISPRUDENCE 466 (1990) (Posner
describes his jurisprudence as characterized by “the continual testing and retesting of accepted
‘truths,’ the constant kicking over of sacred cows—in short, a commitment to robust and freewheeling inquiry with no intellectual quarter asked or given.”).
330. See MaryAnn Spoto, Civil Case Taking Too Long? A Court Advisory Committee Hopes to
Speed That Up, NJ.COM (Apr. 20, 2014), https://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2014/04/civil_case_
taking_too_long_a_court_advisory_committee_hopes_to_speed_that_up.html (explaining that an
advisory committee to the State Supreme Court of New Jersey has offered guidelines for speeding
up civil cases that contain limits on depositions and other aspects of discovery like the time given
the parties to answer interrogatories).
331. See Burkholz Report, supra note 36, at 136.
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here shows just how wrong those assertions can be. Yet their
significant success took fourteen years and a herculean legal effort to
accomplish. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state that the goal
of our legal system is “to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding.”332 If we are truly
committed to that ideal, our legal system must find ways to achieve
swifter justice for defrauded shareholders.

332. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.

